We consider the origins of global current account imbalances. We first discuss how the expansion of the U.S. current account deficit and the decrease in global real interest rates can be reconciled with the widespread view that American expansionary fiscal policy is partly the source of current trends. We then investigate empirically the medium-term determinants of the current account using a model that controls for factors related to institutional development. In addition to the conventional macroeconomic factors, we examine a series of environmental factors, including the degree of financial openness and the extent of legal development. We find that for industrial countries, the government budget balance is an important determinant of the current account balance; the budget balance coefficient is 0.10 to 0.49 depending on model specifications. These varying estimates lead us to conclude that fiscal factors might be as important as excess savings arising from East Asia.
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Introduction
The enormous and rapidly widening U.S. current account deficit, displayed in Figure 1 , has been the source of intense debate in academic and policy circles. The deficit-to-GDP ratio of 6.4
percentage points recorded in the first three quarters of 2006 is high by historical standards, and high in comparison to other developed economies (Edwards, 2005) .
A number of explanations have been forwarded for the recent widening of the U.S. current account deficit. Roughly speaking, the arguments can be categorized as either domestic or international in nature. Some argue that the main reason for the increase in U.S. current account imbalances is the decline in U.S. savings, especially public sector savings, since 2002. In this "twin deficits" argument, the current administration's expansionary fiscal policy bears the greatest blame. Greenspan (2005a,b) , Ferguson (2004) and others have, on the other hand, argued that the impact of fiscal policy on the current account balance is small.
The "global saving glut" explanation, most closely associated with Bernanke (2005) , views excess saving from Asian emerging market countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the financial crisis, as the cause of the U.S. current account deficit (although the current account surpluses of the oil exporting countries have taken on a heightened prominence in recent years). From Bernanke's perspective, the U.S. current account deficit is a caused by forces abroad, and amenable to a solution only in the longer term, as better developed financial systems mitigate this excess savings problem. Low real interest rates are consistent with this excess saving view.
For two reasons, we believe that the Bernanke thesis demands closer examination, despite the surface appeal of the argument. First, in a counterpoint to his previous argument, Bernanke recently testified that one way to reduce the U.S. current account deficit is by increasing public 2 sector saving.
1 Second, as shown in Figure 1 , the current account deficit remains entrenched at about 6.4 percentage points despite the upward movement in real ten year interest rates.
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In this paper, we analyze the determinants of current account balances for industrial and developing countries, while empirically controlling for differences in institutional environment across countries. The data set we employ covers a large and heterogeneous group of countries (19 industrial, 69 developing) over a relatively long time span . Our empirical approach follows Chinn and Prasad (2003) . Their study provided a broad empirical characterization of the medium-term determinants of current account balances for a sample of industrial and developing countries from the perspective of longer-run saving-investment balances.
This paper updates and extends the work of Chinn and Prasad in several important respects.
First, we focus on a potentially important factor identified by Bernanke (2005) , namely the effect of financial development in the context of the legal system and institutions. Second, we allow for nonlinearities via interaction terms. Third, we analyze the determinants of the current account components, namely saving and investment.
3 investment should depend upon how the returns from those activities are protected by these factors.
The extent of institutional development should enhance the effectiveness of financial development and other policy measures such as financial opening. Hence, this paper also devotes special attention to the effect of financial development and examines whether the "financial deepening" argument (Edwards, 1996) or the saving glut argument is applicable for sample countries' saving behavior. In this regard, we estimate a model that controls for financial deepening and interacts it with other variables such as institutional development and financial openness. The focus on financial development is also motivated by the argument that "the U.S. current account is …, in part, a reflection of a global excess of saving relative to profitable investment opportunities in the post-bubble world." (Clarida, 2005a) .
The main findings are as follows. The budget balance is an important determinant of the current account balance for industrial countries; the coefficient for the budget balance variable is 0.15 in a model controlling for institutional variables. A series of robustness checks yield the finding that a one percent point increase in the ratio of budget balance to GDP relative to the weighted world average should lead to a 0.10 to 0.49 percentage point increase in the current account to GDP ratio. We also find that institutional development is an important determinant for the current account balance mainly for higher income countries, although it is important for both saving and investment determination in all country groupings. More importantly, our empirical findings are not consistent with the argument that the more developed financial markets are, the less saving a country undertakes. Especially for most of the East Asian emerging market countries, we find that more financial development leads to higher saving. Furthermore, there is no evidence of East Asian "excess domestic saving". Rather, countries of this region have experienced depressed investment during the post-crisis period. For the United States, our analysis confirms the view that it 4 is a saving drought -not investment boom -that is driving to the enlargement of the current account deficit, although there is some evidence of anomalous behaviour in the latest four year period.
Competing Views on the Sources of the Global Imbalances
As noted above, several commentators have argued that the large current account surpluses in the rest of the world, specifically in East Asia, and more recently the oil exporting countries, are at the heart of the pattern of global imbalances. In this view, these current account surpluses have to be offset somewhere, and that somewhere is in the United States, largely because of the greater attractiveness of American assets. It is a line of reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the current account deficit will continue as long as the phenomenon of excess savings in the rest of the world persists. And, in one interpretation, the end could be years away. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, forthcoming) Prasad and Wei (2005) . 5 See Erceg et al. (2005) . The effect of tax reductions arises from the rule-of-thumb consumers imbedded in a model otherwise characterized by Ricardian equivalence. 5 50 cents on the dollar (Faruqee, et al., 2005) . Furthermore, it is important to realize that there is some disagreement on the econometrically measured size of the effect. The OECD's macroeconometric model implies something around a forty-cent impact on the current account for each dollar's worth of fiscal consolidation (OECD, 2005) ; this larger point estimate is not atypical of macroeconometric models.
Second, it is somewhat odd to think of the East Asian countries driving United States to consumption and saving behavior, especially when the U.S. economy is approximately three times the size of developing and industrializing East Asia. The conventional wisdom is more plausible:
there is a saving scarcity in the United States, driven largely by the Federal budget deficit, and it is this saving drought in the United States that has been sucking in excess savings from the rest of the world for most of the past five years.
The strongest point in favor of the saving glut hypothesis is the observation of a widening current account deficit in the United States, combined with low real world interest rates. However, the saving glut versus twin deficits view is not an either-or proposition. Figure 2 depicts how it is possible for both motivations to coexist. Two regions are graphed -East Asia and the United States.
The National Savings (NS) schedules are functions of fiscal policy, demographics, and the real interest rate. The Investment schedules (I) are functions of the interest rate and many other factors.
In this model, the real interest rate is assumed to be equalized, such that international capital markets would clear, i.e., the current account imbalances between the two economies balance out each other. In period 0, the world interest rate is r 0 , and the U.S. runs a current account deficit, while East Asia runs a corresponding current account surplus. 7 In period 1, the U.S. undertakes an expansionary fiscal policy that pulls in the NS schedule. At the same time, the investment schedule shifts inward in East Asia (e.g., as a result of a financial crisis). This confluence of events drives down the real world interest rate to r 1 . Thus, using a simple open macro model, we can explain the recent rise in U.S. current account deficits, East Asian current account surpluses, and the recent fall in global interest rates by both deficit spending by the U.S. and investment draught in East Asia.
However, also note that the in the absence of a change in fiscal policy, the U.S. current account imbalance would have been much smaller.
In other words, as macroeconomics has moved beyond simple bivariate analyses, so more sophisticated assessments are necessary. We seek to inform the debate by measuring the relationship between fiscal variables and current account balance, conditioning on a series of other variables we think are of importance.
Measuring the Fiscal Effect
Specification
We base the choice of macroeconomic variables for this exercise on the discussion in Chinn and Prasad (2003) .
where CAGDP is the current account balance to GDP ratio, BUSGDP is the budget surplus to GDP 7 ratio, NFA is net foreign assets to GDP ratio, and X includes a set of structural and other macroeconomic variables, and Z includes institutional and policy factors.
We deal with the two key variables and the macro variables first. A variety of models predict a positive relationship between government budget balances (BUSGDP) and current accounts over the medium term. In the absence of a full Ricardian offset via private saving, an increase in the government budget balance could lead to an increase in national saving. In developing economies, where a greater proportion of agents may be liquidity constrained, this relationship might be expected to be more pronounced.
From an intertemporal perspective, the stock of net foreign assets (NFA) serves as an important initial condition, given that the current account is the sum of the trade balance and the return on a country's stock of NFA (or payment on its net foreign liabilities position). Alternatively, from a buffer stock savings perspective, higher levels of initial net foreign assets should be associated with subsequent lower current account balances.
Among the macroeconomic variables (included in X), we include the variable for relative income levels (to the U.S.; RELY) and their square terms in the model specification. The "stages of development" hypothesis for the balance of payments suggests that countries, as they move from a low to an intermediate stage of development, typically import capital and, therefore, run current account deficits. As they reach an advanced stage of development, countries run current account surpluses in order to pay off accumulated external liabilities and also to export capital to less advanced economies.
The literature on the determinants of national saving has pointed to a number of additional "structural" determinants such as demographics (YOUNG and OLD) . Masson et al. (1998) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) . Additional details are contained in the Data Appendix.
One of the innovations in this study is that we focus on potential effects of other factors than conventional macroeconomic variables on the saving and investment determination. These factors are specifically financial development/deepening, financial (capital account) openness, and legal/institutional development, all of which are included in Z in the above specification. "Financial development" or "financial deepening" is often identified as a determinant for saving and investment. While the effect of financial development on investment is unambiguous (i.e., positive), that on saving is not, because higher returns and lower risk of financial investment create effects on saving akin to income and substitution effects. The traditional interpretation of this variable as a measure of the depth and sophistication of the financial system suggests that financial deepening could induce more saving, although a contrasting view holds that more developed financial markets might lessen the need for precautionary saving, and thus have an opposite effect. Bernanke (2005) argues that greater financial development will remedy the global saving glut in the long run by inducing a decline in the savings rate in the emerging Asia. Relatedly, Clarida (2005a,b) 9 argues that the sophisticated equity markets in the U.S. absorb excess saving from all over the world, leading to higher current account deficits. To measure financial development, we use private credit to GDP (PCGDP). 9 The PCGDP data are drawn from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine 
Estimating the Basic Model
The sample for our analysis covers both industrial and developing countries. The underlying database has annual data for 19 industrial and 69 developing countries covering the period 1971-2004. We examine three variables -the current account balance, and its constituents, national saving, and investment, all expressed as a ratio to GDP.
One potential problem with developing country data is the possibility of significant measurement error in annual data. To mitigate these concerns, and to focus our interest in medium-term rather than short-term variations in current accounts, we construct a panel that contains non-overlapping 5-year averages of the data for each country. 14 Furthermore, all the variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into the deviations from their GDP-weighted world mean prior to the calculation of five year averages. The use of demeaned series controls for rest-of-world effects. In other words, a country's current account balance is determined by developments at home as well as abroad.
Because the economic environment may affect the way in which financial development might affect saving and investment we include interaction terms involving these variables.
Interactions between the financial development and legal variables (PCGDP times LEGAL), 12 Higher values indicate better conditions. The choice of these variables is motivated by the literature on the finance and growth, as well as the wide coverage afforded by their use. 13 In other words, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., they are time-invariant. This is primarily due to data availability. The relative shortness of the time series of the ICRG variables makes it difficult to include these variables as panel data. 14 The 2001-04 period has been compressed into one observation, and so represents only 4 years instead of the standard 5.
interactions between the financial development and financial openness variables (PCGDP times KAOPEN), and interactions between legal development and financial openness (LEGAL times KAOPEN). The financial and legal interaction effect is motivated by the conjecture that deepening financial markets might lead to higher saving rates, but the effect might be magnified under conditions of better developed legal institutions. Alternatively, if greater financial deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower investment rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial markets are equipped with highly developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the effect of financial openness on current account balances.
We begin our investigation with a basic specification that excludes institutional variables.
The estimation results are reported in Table 1 . 15 One interesting result shown in the table is the significantly positive relationship between current account and government budget balances found for the industrialized countries group. 16 This result differs from the results obtained in Chinn and Prasad (2003) , who examined a shorter sample from 1971 to 1995. A one percentage point increase in the budget balance would lead to a 0.16 percentage point increase in the current account balance for industrialized countries and 0.24 for less developed countries except for African countries.
While significant, this is substantially less than the estimate obtained by Chinn and Prasad. We attribute this result partly to the differing sample (the estimate is also lower in the 1971-1995 sample), but also to the difference in behavior of current account balances in recent years.
One more noteworthy aspect of Table 1 relates to the financial deepening variable. Only in the industrial countries' current account regressions does it exhibit a negative coefficient, though statistically insignificantly. With these results, one may not be able to conclude that more developed 15 Since these results are sensitive to the inclusion of the African countries, we also report separate sets of results with and without the African countries included, for the developing country sample. We also report separate results for an emerging market group that differs somewhat from the developing country sample. 16 For the remainder of the paper, statistical significance denotes a p-value less than 10%.
financial markets lead to decreased current account balances, as posited by the adherents of the global saving glut thesis.
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As we discussed in a previous section, we also suspect that the omission of other factors such as institutional infrastructure and legal systems may have induced omitted variable bias. As a first step toward addressing this issue, we re-estimated the regressions including country and time fixed effects and dropping those regressors that, by construction, have no time variation -terms of trade volatility and the openness indicator. Once the fixed effects model is estimated, the null hypothesis that country fixed effects are joint zero is rejected for all three models and subsamples at conventional levels of significance.
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In this exercise, the most interesting result is the finding that the coefficient on the government surplus rises to 0.38, and is significant at the 1% marginal significance level. From the national saving and investment regressions (not reported), the positive impact of budget balances on current account balances is detected only in industrial and emerging market countries, and comes mainly from an improvement in the level of national saving.
The Implications of Institutional Development
Given that fixed effects are difficult to interpret in an economically meaningful way, we return to the pooled OLS specification, but augment our basic model specification with variables aimed at capturing institutional factors, namely the legal development variable (LEGAL), financial openness 17 In the saving regressions (not reported), all the sample groups except for the industrial country group have significantly positive coefficients for the financial deepening variable. This issue will be examined more carefully in a later section. 18 We also conducted the Hausman test for all regressions and subsamples to examine whether the distribution of the error terms can be systematically explained by country-specific characteristics. A series of tests indicate that the random effects specification is rejected in favor of the fixed effects for all sample groups except for the developed countries (IDC) and emerging market countries (EMG) groups among the current account regressions; for all except for the IDC group (marginally rejected) among the national saving regressions; and for the full sample and the less developed countries group (LDC) among the investment regressions.
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(KAOPEN), and associated interaction terms (including those with PCGDP). Second, different components of the institutional variable have different effects. We re-estimate the same regressions using each of the components of the LEGAL variable --CORRUPT, BQ, and LAO -in order to isolate which variable drives the results. The test results (not 14 reported) suggest that the inverse corruption index is found to enter the estimation most significantly among the three institutions variables, followed by law and order and the bureaucracy quality index in the order of significance. When the inverse-corruption index is used, the estimated coefficient on the budget balance for the industrial countries group becomes as high as 0.24. Also, the estimated coefficient on the inverse-corruption index is insignificantly negative for the IDC group and significantly negative for the LDC and ex-Africa LCD groups, suggesting that countries with lower degrees of corruption may experience capital inflows (see e.g., Wei, 2000) .
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Third, financial development has different, and nonlinear, effects on saving and investment.
Since the financial development variable (PCGDP) is interacted with other institutional variables (LEGAL and KAOPEN), however, we must be careful about interpretation of the effect of financial development. In Table 3 , we examine the nonlinearities implicit in our estimates from Table 2 . Each of the sub-tables displays the implied response coefficients for differing levels of financial development and capital account openness. Table 3 shows the total effect of a 10% point increase in the relative PCGDP conditional on the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN (the latter as of the 1996-2004 period) -whether their levels are low 10 percentile, mean, or high 10 percentile in each subsample, IDC, LDC, and EMG (Panels A, B, and C, respectively).
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Panel D of Table 3 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia depending on the 21 We also tested the models using the time varying institutional variables (i.e., five-year averages of LEGAL and other component variables instead of the cross-sectional variables). Although we find qualitatively similar results, we also find less significant results for the estimates on the legal variables and their interactions. This finding is not surprising considering that these institutional variables vary much less widely over time than across the countries. We also tested using the five-year averages of the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006 . This is a composite index composed of five subcategories for the size of government; legal structure and intellectual property rights protection; sound monetary management; freer trade; and domestic regulations on credit, labor, and business. We found relatively significant results compared to those with the five-year averages of the LEGAL variable. However, it appears that the results are rather driven by components of the index that are not directly related to legal or institutional development. Figure 3 reports the total effects of a 10 percentage point increase in PCGDP on current account, national savings, and investment for Asian emerging market countries, using specific values for each country's legal development and financial openness measures. 24, 25 The chart indicates that Hong Kong and
Singapore are the only countries for which financial development will cause a negative impact on national savings. Other countries will experience an increase in the ratio of national savings to GDP if financial markets develop further. Interestingly, for all the countries, financial development leads to expansion of investment, presumably because of improved credit conditions and financial intermediation. Furthermore, in terms of the effect on net saving, only Hong Kong and Singapore will experience a substantial deterioration in net savings as a result of further financial deepening because the magnitude of the effect on investment exceeds that on national savings. In the case of Singapore, the current account deteriorates by almost a percentage point in response to a ten 23 It must be noted that most of these Asian emerging market countries comprise top 15 foreign reserves holding countries as of 2004. 24 For the effects on national saving and investment, we use the estimation results from the regressions that are run using the same set of regressors. To conserve space, we do not report the results. They are available from the authors upon request. 25 The estimated effects on the national saving and investment regressions do not strictly add up to that on the current account regressions. At least two reasons can be identified for this outcome. First, while the current account regressions account for the covariance of national savings and investment, simply adding two coefficients does not. That is, if some change in the level of financial development (conditional on financial openness and institutional development) affects national saving and investment independently, as long as the changes in national saving and investment do not affect each other, the total effect would be the same as that on current account balances. However, if national saving and investment are highly correlated, as has been found in many studies such as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Frankel et al. (1987) , simply adding two coefficients does not yield the coefficient in the current account regression. Second, due to differing data conventions (Balance of Payments accounting versus national income accounting definition), the flows may not add up exactly.
percentage point increase in the private credit to GDP ratio. The effect in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand is much more muted, while the China effect is essentially zero.
The Chinese case merits some discussion. China experienced a remarkable 32.4 percentage point increase in private credit creation (net of change in the world weighted average). This financial development alone implied a national savings increase of 1.7 percentage points, but also an investment increase of 2.4 percentage points, suggesting a negative effect of financial development on net saving; the directly estimated zero net effect on the current account reflects the uncertainty surrounding these point estimates.
In sum, these results present evidence against part of the argument that emerging market countries, especially those in East Asia, will experience lower rates of saving once these countries rather than "investment boom." Interestingly, however, the under-prediction of Asian emerging market group ex-China current account balances is a result of the collapse of investment in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. 26, 27 These observations are consistent with the situation depicted in Figure 2 . In sum, we have shown that, from the perspective of the data up to 1995, the larger-than-predicted current account balance East Asia is running is more consistent with an unexpected fall in investment than with the "excess saving" in the region while the current account imbalance for the U.S. is more consistent with a saving drought than with an investment boom.
Robustness Checks
In our framework, simultaneity is of concern. In particular, government budget balances could involve bi-directional causality with the dependent variables. Furthermore, the budget balance variable and other right-hand-side variables may be subject to business cycles effects despite our use of time-averaged data.
Here, we examine the robustness of the estimated coefficient on the budget balance in several ways. First, we implement two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation, instrumenting the budget balance variable with several candidate variables. The instruments we try include a dummy for the left-wing government (LEFT); political constraint (democracy) index (POLCONV); military spending as a ratio to GDP (MILEXP); yearly changes in unemployment rates (D_U); and regional dummies.
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The estimation results are shown in Table 4 , in which we only show estimated coefficients on budget balances for different model specifications and different dependent variables. Rows (1) and (2) show the results from the 2SLS estimation with and without institutional variables. When compared to the results in Table 2 , we can see that, for industrialized countries, the estimated coefficients are consistently significant and their magnitudes are higher than those in the previous analysis.
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Second, we re-estimate with data sampled at an annual frequency, but use HP-detrended 28 The choice of these instruments is based on past findings in the literature on the determinants of budget balances such as Roubini (1991) , Roubini and Sachs (1989a, b) , Persson and Tabellini (2001) , and Braconier and Holden (2004) . The military spending ratio is not included as an instrument in the regressions for industrial countries because it turned out to be insignificant in the first stage regression. The interaction between the left-wing government dummy and the change the unemployment rate is included in the IDC regressions to capture the left-wing government's reaction to change in the unemployment rate. In the LDC and EMG regressions, on the other hand, while the military spending variable is included, neither the unemployment rate change variable nor its interaction with the left-wing government dummy is included due to their statistical insignificance. The definitions and sources of the instruments can be found in Data Appendix. In addition to the variables mentioned in the text, we also tested the dummy for countries with plural political systems; government fragmentation (both from DPI 2004); political constraint, or democracy, index (from Henisz, 2000) ; and the standard deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and Vegh, 2005) . These variables turned out to be insignificant, and were thereby not included as instruments. We also conduct routine statistical tests on the relevance of instruments such as Anderson's (1984) canonical correlations and Cragg-Donald (1993) weak identification tests as well as those on over-identification of instruments using Sargan (1958) J statistic (for the 2SLS with heteroskedasticity standard errors). 29 For the 2SLS regressions with statistically significant coefficients on budget balances, both the Anderson canonical correlation statistic and the Cragg-Donald statistic significantly reject the null hypothesis of under-identification of the instruments. Furthermore, the Sargan J test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the orthogonality conditions. Other results of the first stage regressions are available from the authors upon request.
series for the variables that exhibit business cycles variation -namely, the budget balance, net foreign asset, relative income, output growth, and financial deepening (PCGDP). While sampling five-year period averages should mitigate the effect of business cycles, that method may not be sufficient to completely remove business cycle effects. We apply pooled OLS and the fixed effects specification to obtain the results displayed in rows (3) and (4) of Table 4 , respectively. In order to account for the possibility of serial correlation, we also estimate the model using feasible GLS.
Those results, without and with institutional variables and interactions, are reported in rows (5) and (6) point increase in the current account balances, and between a 17 and 81% point increase in national saving. With these results, we can safely conclude that an increase in the government budget balance does improve the current account balance in industrialized countries, and that effect is mainly achieved through an improvement in national saving. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the medium-term determinants of the current account using a model that controls for institutional factors such as financial openness and legal development, in order to inform the recent debate over the source of and solution to the "global 20 saving glut" that has thus far lacked empirical content. We focused our study on the behavior of current accounts for the United States and emerging market countries in East Asia.
We find that in an industrial country, a one percentage point increase in the budget balance-GDP ratio raises the current account balance by 0.15-16 percentage point. While smaller than the coefficient implied by some macro models, the standard errors on the point estimate are sufficiently large so that one cannot rule out a coefficient as high as 0.34 at conventional significance levels. Alternative specifications suggest that a one percent point increase in the budget balance should lead to between a 0.10 and 0.49 percentage point increase in the ratio of the current account balance to GDP ratio. We also found evidence for a similar relationship for non-IDC countries. These findings are robust to inclusion of institutional variables, although incorporating financial factors seems to matter more (in a statistical sense) for industrialized countries than for less developed countries. Furthermore, we found evidence that the oft-cited effects of financial and legal development are only applicable to industrial countries. Consequently, policy recommendations made by the adherents of the global saving glut view have only tenuous empirical basis insofar as they relate to East Asia.
Finally, we have determined that saving per se is not excessive among the East Asian emerging market countries. Rather, these countries have experienced a shortfall in investment. The
United States, on the other hand, is experiencing saving drought, driven in part by public sector dissaving.
Data Appendix
The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. We provide below a listing of the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables and the source(s) from which the primary data for constructing these variables were taken. A listing of the countries in the final sample, along with the country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper version of this paper. For most countries, data were available from 1971 through 2004. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) ; Polity IV: Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, updated in 2004) ; SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (personal correspondence), and WDI: World Development Indicators (2006) . ** In the original series, KAOPEN and LEGAL series range between negative and positive values since they are the first principal components. However, in order to avoid the complexity of interpreting the estimated coefficients, these variables are adjusted such that the minimum value is zero, i.e., they range between zero and some positive value. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 . 06 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period Current Account % of GDP Fitted values lower limit upper limit 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period Average CA, IDC except G3 pred. value w/out inst. vars yhat_inus_w Industrialized countries excluding G3 -.05-.04-.03-.02-.01 0 .01 .02 .03 . 04 .05 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period Current Account % of GDP pred. value w/out inst. vars. pred. value w/ inst. vars.
Mnemonic
China
-.05-.04-.03-.02-.01 0 .01 .02 .03 . 04 .05 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period avg. CA for ex-China Asian EMG pred. value w/out inst. vars. pred. value w/ inst. vars.
Emerging Asia excluding China .12 .13 .14 . 15 .16 .17 .18 .19 .2 .21 .22 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period Nat'l Saving % of GDP Predicted Nat'l Saving U.S. National Saving .13 .14 . 15 .16 .17 .18 .19 .2 .21 .22 .23 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period Investment % of GDP Pred. Investment U.S. Investment . 18 .2 .22 .24 .26 .28 .3 .32 .34 .36 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period avg. Nat'l Saving for ex-China Asian EMG Predicted Nat'l Saving Nat'l Saving of Emerging Asia excluding China
. 18 .2 .22 .24 .26 .28 .3 .32 .34 .36 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 period avg. Investment for ex-China Asian EMG predicted Investment
Investment of Emerging Asia excluding China
